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Modeling Growth: 
Exogenous, endogenous and Schumpeterian growth models 
 
 
1. Exogenous neoclassical growth model: Solow (1956) 
The Solow (1956) growth model is a model of capital accumulation in a pure production 
economy. No prices are involved as we are interested in output as a measure of real 
income. Also there is no choice in terms work/leisure (all workers work) or savings 
(everybody saves a fixed portion of income). Saving is always invested. Output (real 
income) is shared between capital and labour in accordance with their marginal 
products. Finally, there is no government (and hence no taxes or subsidies) and no 
international trade or financial markets. As such, the Solow model captures the pure 
impact that savings have on the long run standard of living, captured by per-capita 
income. 
Main predictions of the Solow growth model can be summarised as follows: 
 A ‘steady-state growth path’ is reached when output, capital and labour are all 
growing at the same rate. At the steady state, output per worker and capital per 
worker are constant. 
 Shifting the trend rate of growth upward requires an increase in the labour 
supply and also a higher level of productivity of labour and capital. 
 Cross-country differences in the rate of technological change explain much of 
the variation in growth rates that we see. 
 Catching-up and convergence: less developed countries catch up with their 
developed counterparts due to higher marginal rates of return on invested 
capital; and per-capita income in less developed countries converges to the level 
in their developed counterparts.  
The Solow model aims to address an essential problem in growth models without 
technology. The latter implies that per-capita output and per-capita capital do not 
grow at the steady-state. This is inconsistent with empirical evidence, which indicates 
that most advanced economies exhibit growth in per-capita variables in the long run.  
To address this issue, Solow has added a technology variable A into the model as 
follows: 
Y(t) = f [K(t), A(t)L(t)] = K(t)α [A(t)L(t)]1-α     (1) 
Here: Y is real output, K is capital stock, A is technology, L is labour, AL is effective 
labour and α is elasticity of output with respect to capital stock. The term AL implies 
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that labour is more productive when the level of technology is higher (i.e., technology 
is labour-augmenting or Harrod-neutral).   
Solow assumes that technological progress and population growth are exogenous. 
This implies the following levels of technology, labour  and effective labour at year (t): 
A(t) = A(0)egt;   L(t) = L(0)ent     and      [A(t)L(t)] = [A(0)L (0)]e(n+g)t 
Where A(0), L(0) and [A(0)L(0)] are initial levels of technology, labour and effective 
labour.  
Let: 
𝑠 =  
𝑆
𝑌
= 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒;                                                                                                   
 𝑘 =  
𝐾
𝐴𝐿
= 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟  
 𝑦 =  
𝑌
𝐴𝐿
= 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟     
Then (1) can be written as: 
𝑦(𝑡) =  
𝐾(𝑡)𝛼
𝐴𝐿(𝑡)𝛼
= 𝑘(𝑡)𝛼          (2) 
 
According to (2), output per effective labour in year (t) is a positive function of capital 
stock per effective labour k(t) in that year.  
 
Define the evolution of k(t) as the difference between: (a) investment (which is equal 
to savings as a fraction of output) in year (t); and (b) the ratio of capital stock to 
effective labour adjusted for population growth, technology growth and depreciation 
rate. This can be stated as follows: 
 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑦(𝑡) − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑘(𝑡)𝛼 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝑘(𝑡) 
 
Then the ratio of capital stock to effective labour (k) converges to its steady-state value 
(k*) when ?̇?(𝑡) = 0. This yields a steady-state value of capital-to-effective-labour ratio 
given in (3). 
 
𝑠𝑘∗𝛼 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝑘∗ = 0  
→  𝑠𝑘∗𝛼 = (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝑘∗    
→  𝑘∗ = [𝑠 (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)⁄ ]1/(1−𝛼)      (3) 
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Now substitute the steady-state value of capital (K* = k*[A(t)L(t)] into the Cobb-
Douglas production function in (1).  
 
𝑌(𝑡) = [𝑠 (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)1 (1−𝛼)⁄ 𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)⁄ ]
𝛼
[𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)](1−𝛼)  or 
𝑌(𝑡) = [𝑠 (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝛼 (1−𝛼)⁄⁄ ][𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)]     (4) 
 
Take logs of both sides of (4): 
𝑙𝑛𝑌(𝑡) =  
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝑙𝑛𝑠 −
𝛼
1−𝛼
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝑙𝑛𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝑡)  (5) 
 
Express (5) in terms of output per worker: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌(𝑡) −  𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝑡) =  
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝑙𝑛𝑠 −
𝛼
1−𝛼
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝑙𝑛𝐴(𝑡)  (6) 
 
Recall that A(t) = A(0)egt,  then: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌(𝑡) −  𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝑡) =  
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
𝑙𝑛𝑠 −
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝑙𝑛𝐴(0) + 𝑔𝑡 
 
Let 𝑙𝑛𝐴(0) =  𝜃 + 𝜀, then: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌(𝑡) −  𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝑡) =  𝑙𝑛𝑦(𝑡) =  𝜃 + 𝑔𝑡 +
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝑙𝑛𝑠 −
𝛼
1−𝛼
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝜀    (7)  
 
Assuming that the error term (𝜀) is not correlated with the regressors s, n, g and 𝛿; 
equation (8) can be estimated with: 
 OLS if data is averaged over the whole period. In this case, the term gt 
disappears.  
  OR  
 Static panel data methods (FE) if data has a panel structure, with averaging over 
shorter time periods.  
 
Equation (7) is in levels – but can be converted into a growth equation by taking the 
log difference between income in year t and income T years ago, giving:  
 
ln𝑦𝑡 −  ln𝑦𝑡−𝑇 =   𝜃 + 𝑔𝑡 − 0ln𝑦𝑡−𝑇 + 𝛼/(1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛𝑠 − 𝛼/(1 − 𝛼)  𝑙𝑛 (𝑛 + 𝑔 +
𝛿) + 𝑣          (8) 
 
In (8), the convergence rate is β0/𝑇. 
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Assuming that the error term (𝑣) is not correlated with the regressors s, n, g and 𝛿; 
equation (8) can be estimated with: 
 OLS if data is averaged over the whole period. In this case, the term gt 
disappears.  
  OR  
 Dynamic panel data methods (e.g., GMM) if data has a panel structure, with 
averaging over shorter time periods.  
 
 
2. Precursor to endogenous growth models: Augmented Solow (or AK) model  
Omission of human capital in the original Solow model may be problematic from 
theoretical and/or empirical perspectives. Kendrick (1976) argued that more than 50% 
of the US capital stock in 1969 was human capital. Also, Lucas (1988) argued that there 
may be decreasing returns to physical capital accumulation, but increasing returns to 
human capital accumulation. As a result, returns to total capital (physical + human 
capital) may be constant. Then, empirically, absence of human capital in (7) or (8) causes 
omitted variable bias (OVB).   
 
Therefore, endogenous growth models augment the Solow model with human capital 
(H)  - as indicated in (9) below. 
 
Y(t) = f [K(t), A(t)L(t)] = K(t)αH(t)β [A(t)L(t)]1-α-β    (9) 
 
Following the routine above, we can write the augmented model as follows: 
 
ln𝑦𝑡 −  ln𝑦𝑡−𝑇 =   𝜃 + 𝑔𝑡 − β0ln𝑦𝑡−𝑇  −  (
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
) ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + δ)  
+ (
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
) ln𝑠𝑘 + (
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
) ln 𝑠ℎ + 𝑣      (9a) 
 
Where sh and sk are ratios of physical and human capital to effective labour, 
respectively.  
 
Implications of the augmented Solow model is similar to the original Solow model. A 
larger saving rate implies a higher level of output per capita; and a larger rate of 
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population growth implies a smaller level of output per capita. The novelty is that a 
larger ratio of human capital to effective labour is associated with higher level of 
output per capita.  
 
As it is the case in the Solow model, the coefficients are functions of factor shares. The 
difference is that the coefficient on physical capital is larger. This is explained as follows: 
higher saving leads to higher income and this leads to a higher steady-state level of 
human capital - even if the percentage of income devoted to human-capital 
accumulation is unchanged. Hence, the presence of human-capital accumulation 
increases the impact of physical-capital accumulation on income. Secondly, the 
coefficient on ln(n + g + δ) is larger in absolute value. The implication is that population 
growth is associated with a more adverse effect on per-capita income. This is because 
not only capital but also human capital will be spread more thinly over the larger 
population. In a nutshell, omitting the human-capital term biases the coefficients on 
saving and population growth.  
 
Both neoclassical growth models are criticised for lacking policy implications. In these 
models, growth is purely a function of inputs and technology is exogenous. Stated 
differently, there is no room for ‘growth policy’ (Aghion and Hovitt, 2006).  
 
Further criticisms include the following:  
 
From a heterodox perspective, the neoclassical models are criticised on the grounds 
that:  
 They assume full employment of labour and full capacity utilization  
 They assume no effective demand failures 
 They do not have an ‘investment function’ in addition to and independently of 
the savings function (they overlook the scope for investment-led growth) 
 They overlook the reverse causality between output growth and labour 
productivity (Verdoorn’s Law) 
 
From a Schumpeterian perspective (Aghion and Hovitt, 2006), the neo-classical models 
are criticised for:  
 
 Failing to explain why the US has been growing faster than Europe since the mid-
1990s -  even though the average European saving rate has been higher than the 
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US rate. Also, the average European capital-labor ratio has remained higher than 
the US ratio and has not decreased.  
 Failing to explain why the growth gap between Europe and the US has persisted 
despite the fact that the institutions of property rights (which affect technology 
adoption) have been similar.  
 
In fact, according to Aghion and Hovitt (2006) the ‘first version of endogenous growth 
theory’ (or the so-called AK models) did not make an explicit distinction between 
capital accumulation and technological progress. It just lumped together the physical 
and human capital. The accumulation of the latter is studied as intellectual capital 
accumulation that occurs when technological progress is made. This is evident in 
Lucas’s (1988) influential contribution, which followed Uzawa (1965) by assuming that 
human capital and technological knowledge were one and the same. 
 
 
3. Endogenous growth models mark 2: Schumpeterian models  
 
The augmented Solow model was followed by a second wave of endogenous growth 
theory, generally known as ‘innovation-based’ growth theory. The latter recognizes that 
intellectual capital, the source of technological progress, is distinct from physical and 
human capital. Physical and human capital are accumulated through saving and 
schooling, but intellectual capital grows through innovation. 
 
One version of innovation-based theory was initiated by Romer (1990), who assumed 
that aggregate productivity is an increasing function of the degree of product variety. In 
this theory, innovation causes productivity growth by creating new, but not necessarily 
improved, varieties of products. 
 
It makes use of the Dixit–Stiglitz–Ethier production function, in which final output is 
produced by labour and a continuum of intermediate products: 
 
𝑌 =  𝐿1−𝛼 ∫ 𝑥(𝑖)𝛼𝑑𝑖,        0 < 𝛼 < 1
𝐴
0
       (10) 
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where L is the aggregate supply of labour (assumed to be constant), x(i) is the flow input 
of intermediate products, and A is the measure of different intermediate products that 
are available for use.  
 
Intuitively, an increase in product variety, as measured by A, raises productivity by 
allowing society to spread its intermediate production more thinly across a larger 
number of activities, each of which is subject to diminishing returns and hence exhibits 
a higher average product when operated at a lower intensity. 
 
The other version of innovation-based growth theory is the ‘Schumpeterian’ theory 
developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). (Early 
models were produced by Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos, 1990, and Corriveau, 
1991). Schumpeterian theory focuses on quality-improving innovations that render old 
products obsolete, through the process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942).  
 
In Schumpeterian theory aggregate output is again produced by a continuum of 
intermediate products, this time according to: 
 
𝑌 =  𝐿1−𝛼 ∫ 𝐴(𝑖)1−𝛼𝑥(𝑖)𝛼𝑑𝑖,   
1
0
        (11) 
 
Compared to In (10), there is a fixed measure of product variety, normalized to unity, 
and each intermediate product i has a separate productivity parameter A(i). 
 
Each sector is monopolized and produces its intermediate product with a constant 
marginal cost of unity. The monopolist in sector i faces a demand curve given by the 
marginal product:  
 
𝛼. (𝐴(𝑖)𝐿/𝑥(𝑖)1−𝛼 
 
of that intermediate input in the final sector. Equating marginal revenue (α times this 
marginal product) to the marginal cost of unity yields the monopolist’s profit-maximizing 
intermediate output: 
 
𝑥(𝑖) =  𝜑𝐿𝐴(𝑖),    where 𝜑 =  𝛼2/(1−𝛼) 
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Using this to substitute for each x(i) in the production function (11) yields the aggregate 
production function: 
 
𝑌 =  𝜃𝐴𝐿           (12) 
 
where    𝜃 =  𝜑𝛼  and A is the average productivity parameter: 𝐴 ≡ ∫ 𝐴(𝑖)
1
0
𝑑𝑖 
 
Innovations in Schumpeterian theory create improved versions of old products. An 
innovation in sector i consists of a new version whose productivity parameter A(i) 
exceeds that of the previous version by the fixed factor  𝛾 > 1. (We can call 𝛾 as the 
productivity premium on innovation) 
 
Suppose that the probability of an innovation arriving in sector i over any short interval 
of length dt is    𝜇. 𝑑𝑡.  
 
Then the growth rate of A(i) is 
 
𝑑(𝐴(𝑖))
𝐴(𝑖)
.
1
𝑑𝑡
= {
(𝛾 − 1). 𝑑𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝜇. 𝑑𝑡
0          𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 1 −  𝜇. 𝑑𝑡
 
 
Therefore the expected growth rate of A(i) is:  
 
𝐸(𝑔) =  𝜇(𝛾 − 1)          (13) 
 
 
We can call 𝜇 as the flow probability of innovation.  In any sector, it is proportional to 
the current flow of productivity-adjusted R&D expenditures: 
  
𝜇 =  𝜆𝑅/𝐴           (14) 
 
where R is the amount of final output spent on R&D. Dividing it by A takes into account 
the force of increasing complexity. That is, as technology advances it becomes more 
complex, and hence society must make an ever-increasing expenditure on research and 
development just to keep innovating at the same rate as before. 
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The law of large numbers guarantees that the growth rate g equals the expected growth 
rate in (13). Thus, from (13) and (14) we have: 
 
𝑔 = (𝛾 − 1)𝜆𝑅/𝐴          (15) 
 
Let’s define the fraction of GDP spent on research and development as:  
 
𝑛 = 𝑅/𝑌            (16) 
 
Combining (12), (15) and (16), we obtain:  
 
𝑔 = (𝛾 − 1)𝜆𝜃𝑛𝐿          (17) 
 
Thus, innovation-based theory implies that the way to grow rapidly is not to save a 
large fraction of output but to devote a large fraction (n) of output to research and 
development.  
 
The theory is explicit about how R&D activities are influenced by various policies, who 
gains from technological progress, who loses, how the gains and losses depend on 
social arrangements, and how such arrangements affect society’s willingness and 
ability to create and cope with technological change, which is the ultimate source of 
economic growth. 
 
Empirical challenges 
 
The endogenous growth theory (including its Schumpeterian version) has been 
challenged on empirical grounds.  
 
Critique 1: For example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) 
and Evans (1996) showed, using data from the second half of the 20th century, that most 
countries seem to be converging to roughly similar long-run growth rates.  
 
Yet, Schumpeterian growth theory seems to imply that, because many countries have 
different policies and institutions, they should have different long-run growth rates. 
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Proponents of Schumpeterian growth theory have responded with modifications that 
make the theory consistent with the critics’ evidence.  
 
For example, the Schumpeterian model of Howitt (2000) incorporates the force of 
technology transfer. Here, the productivity of R&D in one country is enhanced by 
innovations in other countries (diffusion). This implies that all countries that perform 
R&D at a positive level should converge to parallel long-run growth paths. 
 
The key to this convergence is what Gerschenkron (1952) called the ‘advantage of 
backwardness’; that is, the further a country falls behind the technology frontier, the 
larger is the average size of innovations, because the larger is the gap between the 
frontier ideas incorporated in the country’s innovations and the ideas incorporated in 
the old technologies being replaced by innovations. This increase in the size of 
innovations keeps raising the laggard country’s growth rate until the gap separating it 
from the frontier finally stabilizes. 
 
Critique 2: Jones (1995) has argued that the evidence of the United States and other 
OECD countries since 1950 refutes the ‘scale effect’ of Schumpeterian endogenous 
growth theory. That is, according to the growth equation (12) an increase in the size of 
population should raise long-run growth by increasing the size of the workforce L, thus 
providing a larger market for a successful innovator and inducing a higher rate of 
innovation. 
 
But in fact productivity growth has remained stationary during a period when 
population, and in particular the number of people engaged in R&D, has risen 
dramatically.  
 
The models of Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Peretto (1998) and Howitt (1999) 
counter this criticism by incorporating Young’s (1998) insight that, as an economy grows, 
proliferation of product varieties reduces the effectiveness of R&D aimed at quality 
improvement by causing it to be spread more thinly over a larger number of different 
sectors. 
 
When modified this way the theory is consistent with the observed coexistence of 
stationary TFP growth and rising population, because in a steady state the growth-
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enhancing scale effect is just offset by the growth-reducing effect of product 
proliferation. 
 
Critique 3: Early versions of innovation-based growth theory implied that growth would 
be adversely affected by stronger competition laws. This is because competition reduces 
the profits that imperfectly competitive firms can earn reduce the incentive to innovate. 
This was found to be refuted by evidence 
 
However, Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 7) describe a variety of channels through which 
competition might in fact spur economic growth. One such channel is provided by the 
work of Aghion et al. (2001). The latter show that an increase in the intensity of 
competition will tend to reduce the absolute level of profits realized by a successful 
innovator, but it will also tend to reduce the profits of an unsuccessful innovator by even 
more. In this variant of Schumpeterian theory, more intense competition can have a 
positive effect on the rate of innovation because firms will want to escape the 
competition that they would face if they lost whatever technological advantage they 
have over their rivals. 
 
Aghion et all (2013) demonstrate that the relationship between competition and 
productivity has an inverted-U shape. 
 
 
4. Combining Schumpeterian growth models with institutional models of growth: the 
case of democracy 
 
This variant of growth models combine the insights from the Schumpeterian innovation 
and institutional economics. In a seminal paper, Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) 
propose a model that differentiates between economic growth in developed and 
developing countries. In the model, the driver of growth in developing countries consists 
of adoption and imitation of existing technologies and investment in existing lines of 
business. Growth in advanced (frontier) economies is driven by innovation.  
 
The paper offers a number of insights about the relationship between 
institutions/organizations, economic growth and economic development. One of these 
insights relates to the notion of “appropriate institutions/organizations”. Stated simply, 
the equilibrium organization of production and the broader institutions of the society 
may differ countries depending on: (a) the level of development; and (b) the distance of 
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the country’s technology to the frontier technology. The other insight is that attempts 
to impose such “appropriate institutions” from the outside can turn them into 
“inappropriate institutions,” i.e., into barriers to further convergence of a developing 
economy. This is just the opposite of what the Washington Consensus has been 
prescribing for developing countries.  
 
The model in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) allows for a number of predictions: 
 
Prediction 1: Average growth should decrease more rapidly as a country approaches the 
world frontier when openness is low. 
 
Prediction 2: High entry barriers become increasingly detrimental to growth as the 
country approaches the frontier. 
 
These two empirical exercises point to the importance of interacting institutions or 
policies with technological variables in growth regressions: openness is particularly 
growth-enhancing in countries that are closer to the technological frontier; entry is more 
growth-enhancing in countries or sectors that are closer to the technological frontier. 
 
Below we will see that higher (in particular, graduate) education tends to be more 
growth-enhancing in countries or in US states that are closer to the technological 
frontier, whereas primary-secondary (possibly undergraduate) education tends to be 
more growth enhancing in countries or in US states that are farther below the frontier. 
 
These findings are supported in Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche (2009). 
This study uses cross-US-states panel data to look at how spending on various levels of 
education matter differently for growth across US states with different levels of 
frontierness as measured by their average productivity compared to frontier-state 
(Californian) productivity.  
 
Prediction 3: The more frontier an economy is, the more growth in this economy relies 
on research education. 
 
 
Innovation, democracy and growth 
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Does democracy enhance or hamper economic growth? One may think of various 
channels whereby democracy should affect per-capita GDP growth.  
 
A first channel is that democracy pushes for more redistribution from rich to poor, and 
that redistribution in turn affects growth. 
 
Along this line, Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) analyze the 
relationship between inequality, democratic voting, and growth. They develop models 
in which redistribution from rich to poor is detrimental to growth as it discourages 
capital accumulation. More inequality is then also detrimental to growth because it 
results in the median voter becoming poorer and therefore demanding more 
redistribution.  
 
A second channel, which we explore in this section, is Schumpeterian. In this 
perspective, democracy reduces the scope for expropriating successful innovators or for 
incumbents to prevent new entry by using political pressure or bribes. In other words, 
democracy facilitates creative destruction and thereby encourages innovation. 
 
To the extent that innovation matters more for growth in more frontier economies, the 
prediction is: 
 
Prediction 4: The correlation between democracy and innovation/growth is more 
positive and significant in more frontier economies. 
 
Aghion et al (2013) provides a comprehensive assessment of what we can learn from 
Schumpeterian growth theory. In what follows, I draw liberally on that paper to highlight 
the relationship between innovation, democracy and growth. 
 
Consider the following Schumpeterian model in discrete time. All agents and firms live 
for one period. In each period t a final good (henceforth the numeraire) is produced in 
each state by a competitive sector using a continuum one of intermediate inputs, 
according to the technology: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 = ∫ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑗
1
0
          (18) 
 
where the intermediate products are produced again by labour according to: 
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𝑦𝑗𝑡 =  𝐴𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑗𝑡           (19) 
 
There is a competitive fringe of firms in each sector that are capable of producing a 
product with technology level: 𝐴𝑗𝑡/𝛾  
 
So, each incumbent’s profit flow is 
 
𝜋 =  
𝛾−1
𝛾
           (20) 
 
Note that each incumbent will produce using the same amount of labour (l) 
 
𝑙𝑗𝑡 =  
𝑌𝑡
𝛾𝑤𝑡
≡ 𝑙          (21) 
 
where l is the economy’s total use of manufacturing labour.  
 
We assume that there is 1 unit of labour that is used only for production. Therefore l = 
1, and this implies that: 
 
𝑤𝑡 =  
𝑌𝑡
𝛾
           (22) 
 
Finally, (9) ; (10) and (11) deliver the final output as a function of the aggregate 
productivity At in this economy: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡            (23) 
 
With 𝐴𝑡 = ∫ 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑗
1
0
   as the end-of-period-t aggregate productivity index: 
 
Technology and entry  
 
Let At denote the world productivity frontier at date t and assume that 
 
?̅?𝑡 = 𝛾?̅?𝑡−1           (24) 
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with 𝛾 > 1 and exogenously given.  
 
In Schumpeterian models, the sectors differ with respect to the type of technological 
competition. There are sectors where the incumbent producer is “neck-and neck” with 
the frontier; and those in which the incumbent firm is below the frontier. 
 
At the beginning of date t a sector j can either be at the current frontier, with 
productivity level  
 
𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑏 = ?̅?𝑡−1           (25) 
 
or one step below the frontier, with productivity level  
 
𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑏 = ?̅?𝑡−2           (26) 
 
Thus, imitation -or knowledge spillovers- in this model means that whenever the frontier 
moves up one step from ?̅?𝑡−1 to ?̅?𝑡, then backward sectors also automatically move up 
one step from ?̅?𝑡−2 to ?̅?𝑡−1. 
 
In each intermediate sector j only one incumbent firm Ij and one potential entrant Ej are 
active in each period.  
 
In this model, innovation in a sector is made only by a potential entrant Ej since 
innovation does not change the incumbent’s profit rate.  
 
Before production takes place, potential entrant Ej invests in R&D in order to replace the 
incumbent Ij.  
 
If successful, it increases the current productivity of sector j to  
 
𝐴𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑏             (27) 
 
and becomes the new monopolist and produces. Otherwise, the current incumbent 
preserves its monopoly right and produces with the beginning-of-period productivity 
𝐴𝑗𝑡 = 𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑏  and the period ends.  
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Finally, the innovation technology is as follows: if a potential entrant Ej spends  
𝐴𝑡𝜆𝑧𝑗𝑡
2
2
   on R&D in terms of the final good, then it innovates with probability zjt (innovation 
effort) 
 
 Democracy  
 
Entry into a sector is subject to the democratic environment in the domestic country. 
Similar to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Aghion et al (2013) model democracy as 
freedom to entry. In a country with democracy level   𝛽𝜖[0,1], a successful innovation 
leads to successful entry only with probability β, and it is blocked with probability (1 - 
β). 
 
As a result, the probability of an unblocked entry is βzj  
 
An unblocked entrant raises productivity from 𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑏  𝑡𝑜 𝛾𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑏    and becomes the new 
monopoly producer. 
 
 
Equilibrium investment in innovation  
 
The innovation decision of the potential entrant Ej is given by: 
 
max
𝑧𝑗𝑡
 { 𝑧𝑗𝑡𝛽𝜋𝑌𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡𝜆
𝑧𝑗𝑡
2
2
         (28) 
 
 
In equilibrium: 
 
𝑧𝑗𝑡 = 𝑧̅ =  
𝛽𝜋
𝜆
          (29) 
 
The aggregate equilibrium innovation effort is increasing in profits and decreasing in 
R&D cost.  
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Most important for us, the innovation rate is increasing in the democracy level: 
 
 
𝛿?̅?
𝛿𝛽
> 0           (30) 
 
 
 
Growth  
 
Now we can turn to the equilibrium growth rate of average productivity. The average 
productivity of a country at the beginning of date t is 
 
𝐴𝑡−1 =  ∫ 𝐴𝑗𝑡𝑑𝑗
1
0
=  𝜇?̅?𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜇)?̅?𝑡−2      (31) 
 
 
Average productivity at the end of the same period is: 
 
𝐴𝑡 =  𝜇[𝛽𝑧̅𝛾?̅?𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽𝑧̅)?̅?𝑡−1] + (1 − 𝜇)?̅?𝑡−1     (32) 
 
 
Then the growth rate of average productivity is simply equal to: 
 
𝑔𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑡−𝐴𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛾
𝜇𝛽?̅?(𝛾−1)+1
𝜇(𝛾−1)+1
         (33) 
 
Taking partial differential with respect to democracy (β), we can see that democracy is 
always growth enhancing: 
 
𝛿𝑔𝑡
𝛿𝛽
= (𝑧̅ +  
𝛿?̅?
𝛿𝛽
𝛽)(
𝛾𝜇(𝛾−1)
𝜇(𝛾−1)+1
> 0        (34) 
 
 
Moreover, democracy is more growth enhancing the closer the domestic country is to 
the world technology frontier: 
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𝛿2𝑔𝑡
𝛿𝛽𝛿𝜇
= (𝑧̅ +  
𝛿?̅?
𝛿𝛽
𝛽)(
𝛾(𝛾−1)
[𝜇(𝛾−1)+1]2
> 0       (35) 
 
This result is quite intuitive. Democratization allows for more turnover (entry and exit) 
that, in turn, encourages outsiders to innovate and replace the incumbents. Since 
frontier countries rely more on innovation and benefit less from imitation or spillovers, 
the result follows. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Neoclassical theory has informed growth models with and without human capital. These 
models have been shown to perform well in estimating the effects of human and 
physical capital on growth towards the steady state. They have also been shown to 
estimate convergence rates (Mankiw et al., 1992). However, they have also been 
criticised for failing to explain the difference in growth rates of Europe and the US 
despite similar institutional characteristics and similar or even higher saving rates or 
capital-labour ratio in Europe. Furthermore, convergence rates estimated with 
neoclassical growth models vary significantly between samples/studies – with a mean 
of 4.3% and minimum and maximum values of 1.43% and 8.34% respectively (Abreu et 
al., 2005). 
 
In Schumpeterian models, growth results from quality-improving innovations. Unlike 
endogenous growth models informed by neoclassical theory (Romer, 1990), they 
highlight the importance of key economic variables such as the country’s distance to the 
technological frontier, its institutional quality or its degree of financial development. 
This feature enables Schumpeterian models to address policy-relevant questions.  
Nevertheless, both neoclassical and Schumpeterian models share the common 
characteristic of being supply-side models. The challenge is to explore the extent to 
which growth may be affected by effective demand failures – or more interestingly, it 
may generate such failures. 
 
 
  
21 
 
References 
 
Abreu, M., H. L. De Groot, and R. J. Florax (2005). A Meta‐Analysis of β‐Convergence: the 
Legendary 2%. Journal of Economic Surveys, 19(3), 389-420. 
 
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, and F. Zilibotti. (2006). .Distance to Frontier, Selection, and 
Economic Growth. Journal of the European Economic Association, 37-74. 
 
Aghion, P., Boustan, L., Hoxby, C., & Vandenbussche, J. (2009). ‘Exploiting States’. In DH 
Romer and J. Wolfers (eds), Mistakes to Identify the Causal Impact of Higher Education 
on Growth’, Harvard University Manuscript. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity: 
Spring (2009). 
 
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1992). A model of growth through creative destruction. 
Econometrica 60, 323–51. 
 
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1998). Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (2006). Joseph schumpeter lecture appropriate growth policy: A 
unifying framework. Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(2‐3), 269-314. 
 
Aghion, P., Akcigit, U., & Howitt, P. (2013). What do we learn from Schumpeterian 
growth theory? (No. w18824). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Aghion, P., Harris, C., Howitt, P. and Vickers, J. (2001). Competition, imitation and growth 
with step-by-step innovation. Review of Economic Studies 68, 467–92. 
 
Barro, R.J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. 1992. Convergence. Journal of Political Economy 100, 
223–51. 
 
Corriveau, L. 1991. Entrepreneurs, Growth, and Cycles. Doctoral Dissertation, University 
of Western Ontario. 
 
Dinopoulos, E. and Thompson, P. 1998. Schumpeterian growth without scale effects. 
Journal of Economic Growth 3, 313–35. 
22 
 
 
Evans, P. 1996. Using cross-country variances to evaluate growth theories. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 20, 1027–49. 
 
Frankel, M. 1962. The production function in allocation and growth: a synthesis. 
American Economic Review 52, 995–1022. 
 
Gerschenkron, A. 1952. Economic backwardness in historical perspective. In The 
Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, ed. B.F. Hoselitz. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Howitt, P. 1999. Steady endogenous growth with population and R&D inputs growing. 
Journal of Political Economy 107, 715–30. 
 
Howitt, P. 2000. Endogenous growth and cross-country income differences. American 
Economic Review 90, 829–46. 
 
Jones, C.I. 1995. R&D-based models of economic growth. Journal of Political Economy 
103, 759–84. 
 
Kendrick, John W. (1976).  The Formation and Stocks of Total Capital (New York: 
Columbia University for NBER, 1976). 
 
Kurz, Heinz D.  and Neri Salvadori (20??). New Growth Theory and Development 
Economics. Mimeograph .  
 
Lucas, R.E., Jr. 1988. On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 22, 3–42. 
 
Mankiw, N.G., Romer, D. and Weil, D.N. 1992. A contribution to the empirics of 
economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 407–37. 
 
23 
 
Peretto, P.F. 1998. Technological change and population growth. Journal of Economic 
Growth 3, 283–311. 
 
Romer, P.M. 1986. Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy 
94, 1002–37. 
 
Romer, P.M. 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy 98, 
S71–S102. 
 
Schumpeter, J.A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper. 
 
Segerstrom, P.S., Anant, T.C.A. and Dinopoulos, E. 1990. A Schumpeterian model of the 
product life cycle. American Economic Review 80, 1077–91. 
 
Solow, R.M. 1956. A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 70, 65–94. 
 
Swan, T.W. 1956. Economic growth and capital accumulation. Economic Record 32, 334–
61. 
 
Uzawa, H. 1965. Optimal technical change in an aggregative model of economic growth. 
International Economic Review 6, 18–31. 
 
Young, A. 1998. Growth without scale effects. Journal of Political Economy 106, 41–63. 
 
 
